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The Amherst embassy and British discoveries in China 
 
Abstract 
The Amherst embassy to China has long been viewed as a major diplomatic failure in 
Britain’s early relations with China. This article concentrates on the greatly overlooked 
aspect of the Amherst mission – the delegation’s discoveries in China after the official 
proceedings were concluded. Since the embassy was given unprecedented freedom of 
movement during its four-month return journey from Beijing to Canton, British observers 
were able to explore the interior of China and to communicate more fully with the Chinese 
government and people than ever before. As a consequence, the Amherst embassy not only 
provided valuable first-hand observations which increased and improved Britain’s knowledge 
of China, but developed the view that the Qing government was the chief obstacle to the 
progress of Chinese civilization and to the general welfare of the Chinese people. These 
important perceptions laid the foundation for future changes in Sino-British relations and led, 
indirectly, to the outbreak of the Opium War. 
 
The Amherst embassy to China (1816-17) is a largely under-researched, but very critical, 
event in the progress of British-Chinese relations. It was dispatched twenty-two years after 
the unsuccessful Macartney embassy (1792-4), the inaugural British mission to China, and 
was the British government’s second attempt to improve the country’s commercial and 
diplomatic relations with the Chinese empire. Compared to Macartney’s embassy, which was 
at least given the opportunity to meet the Qianlong emperor, the Amherst mission has long 
been regarded as less productive, primarily because it did not even achieve an audience with 
the Jiaqing emperor. Largely for this reason, unlike Macartney’s mission, the Amherst 
embassy has attracted very little scholarly attention. No major secondary source deals 
specifically with this incident and most studies which have mentioned it are rather brief and 
are largely descriptive.1 This neglect of the Amherst embassy, moreover, is partly because the 
official proceedings of this mission lasted only about twenty days, a fact has led one historian 
to remark that ‘except for creating ill feeling on both sides, nothing was achieved’.2 Although, 
as in the case of the Macartney embassy, Amherst’s refusal to kowtow to the Chinese 
emperor has been studied,3 the importance of the British travellers’ discoveries during the rest 
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of their stay in China, especially during their four-month return journey through the interior 
of the Chinese empire, has been very largely overlooked. This failure to investigate the 
various views of China developed and published by several members of the Amherst 
embassy, has left much valuable information on Britain’s early perceptions of China 
unexplored. Only by investigating what information and attitudes were disseminated to the 
British public by these members of the Amherst embassy is it possible to understand how 
Britain perceived the Chinese government and its relations with it on the eve of the fateful 
Opium War of the 1840s. 
 
I  
From the early seventeenth to the second half of the eighteenth century, Catholic missionaries 
in China and some key enlightenment philosophers, such as Leibniz and Voltaire, aroused 
widespread enthusiasm for Chinese civilization in Europe.4 Partly as a consequence, Britain 
developed an admiration for China, which reached its pinnacle in the late seventeenth 
century. 5  Although, during the course of the eighteenth century, the balance between 
favourable and unfavourable views of China in Britain was shifting away from the former 
and towards the latter,6 this change of attitude was largely owing to the changing values of 
British society,7 rather than British people’s direct discoveries about the Chinese empire. 
Apart from Commodore George Anson’s Voyage Round the World (1748),8 for most of the 
eighteenth century, Britain could benefit from very few first-hand accounts of China written 
by British travellers to that country. The real situation of the Chinese empire hence remained 
by and large mysterious. In this context, the Macartney embassy provided the very first 
opportunity for some Britons to traverse the interior of China and to observe the country 
more closely than ever before. Although this first embassy failed to achieve its commercial 
and diplomatic objectives, these British travellers were able to bring home some first-hand 
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observations on the current state of the Chinese empire. Most notably, after examining 
various aspects of Chinese society, both Macartney and his deputy, George Leonard Staunton, 
were convinced that, despite the high degree of perfection which the Chinese had achieved in 
the past, they had failed to progress and had even taken some retrograde steps in recent 
times.9 This belief in China’s backwardness particularly appealed to Britain’s elite class at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, but until the launch of the Amherst embassy in 1816, a 
general consensus on the state of Chinese civilization had not yet been reached in Britain.   
        This failure to achieve an agreed image of China terminated, however, after the Amherst 
embassy. In comparison with the Macartney mission, members of the Amherst embassy were 
provided with much greater opportunities to explore the real state of Chinese society. During 
the return journey from Beijing to Canton [Guangzhou], in particular, the experience of 
Amherst’s mission differed markedly from that of the previous embassy. The Macartney 
embassy’s freedom of movement had been strictly constrained by the government of the 
Qianlong emperor. In Macartney’s own words, throughout the embassy’s residence in China, 
‘we have indeed been very narrowly watched, and all our customs, habits and proceedings, 
even of the most trivial nature, observed with an inquisitiveness and jealousy which 
surpassed all that we had read of in the history of China’.10 During the embassy’s return 
journey, particular care was taken by the Chinese authorities to prevent the British from 
making contact with the common people of China. When the British requested permission to 
make some excursions from their boats into the nearby towns or countryside, ‘our wishes 
were seldom gratified’.11 In sharp contrast, the Amherst embassy was not subject to the same 
restrictions during most of its stay in China. After its members were compelled to leave 
Beijing, the Amherst mission quite unexpectedly enjoyed ‘a greater degree of liberty than had 
been granted to any former embassy’. 12  During their prolonged return journey across 
mainland China, members of the Amherst mission were not only allowed to wander about 
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various Chinese cities, towns and rural areas, but were also able to have contact with different 
ranks of Chinese people, including artisans, merchants and others in the middle and lower 
ranks of Chinese society. This unprecedented liberty of movement enabled these travellers to 
observe the Chinese empire more closely than any previous British visitors. In consequence, 
Britain’s limited first-hand knowledge on China was greatly expanded, when members of the 
embassy reported on their experiences after their return to Britain. 
        Moreover, the Amherst embassy’s return journey covered new areas and lasted a longer 
time. Unlike the Macartney mission which travelled to the southern end of the Grand Canal, 
the Amherst embassy transferred from Guazhou to the renowned Yangtze River. Its members 
then sailed 285 miles along the Yangtze to join the Poyang Lake, from whence the embassy 
travelled on smaller inland waterways to Canton. The Jiaqing emperor ordered the British to 
be conducted along this route, because it was believed to be the quickest route from Beijing 
to Canton. Nevertheless, due to adverse weather conditions, the journey took considerably 
longer than expected. It resulted in ‘the fortunate occasion’13 which allowed members of the 
Amherst embassy not only to spend more time in the interior of China, but also to visit some 
parts of the lower Yangtze delta, the most prosperous region of the Chinese empire that had 
hitherto not been explored by any Europeans. 
        As a consequence of the opportunities afforded by this journey to these British visitors, 
the first-hand evidence about the country and the people of China gained by the Amherst 
embassy was far greater than that gained by members of Macartney’s embassy. Eleven 
members of the Amherst mission left more than fifteen accounts of their visit to China. 
Although Amherst’s diary was lost because of the shipwreck of the embassy’s main ship on 
its return voyage, some of Amherst’s observations on China can still be found in the India 
Office Library and Records held in the British Library. George Thomas Staunton, 
Macartney’s page on the first mission and the son of George Leonard Staunton, served as the 
5 
 
second commissioner of the Amherst embassy. As an eminent ‘China expert’, Staunton 
subsequently produced several works that relate to the Amherst mission.14 Henry Ellis, the 
third commissioner, published his Journal of the Proceedings of the Late Embassy to China 
shortly after he returned to Britain.15 This book was widely considered to be the most official 
account of the Amherst mission. Robert Morrison, who had entered China in 1807 as the 
pioneer Protestant missionary, was the chief translator for Amherst’s embassy. With his 
remarkable knowledge of the Chinese culture and language, Morrison was able to publish A 
View of China16 as well as his memoir of the Amherst mission.17 After Morrison died, his 
wife compiled the two-volume Memoirs of the Life and Labours of Robert Morrison, D.D., 
which complements Morrison’s observations on China published in his earlier works.18 John 
Francis Davis, who also had a good command of the Chinese language,19 authored a number 
of books on China and its people, such as Sketches of China which includes his journal of the 
embassy. Apart from these individuals, other members of the Amherst mission who kept or 
published journals of their visit to China include: Clarke Abel, the chief medical officer and 
naturalist; John Macleod, a surgeon aboard the Alceste; Basil Hall, the commander of HMS 
Lyra; and Henry Hayne, Amherst’s private secretary.20 
        Despite the relative abundance of available primary sources, it should be noted that, 
under the influence of Edward Said’s Orientalism, an increasing number of historians have 
been aware of the patronizing attitudes which westerners often adopted towards oriental 
societies during their encounters with the latter.21 Elizabeth Hope Chang, for example, has 
stated in her recent book that, instead of showing China as it really was, the vision of China 
in nineteenth-century Europe was ‘in fact a reflection mirrored back to the European reader 
by a representation made by a Western writer’. 22  Such views are unquestionably useful 
correctives for our previous understanding of early western attitudes towards China, but, in 
the case of the Amherst embassy, it would be equally erroneous to ignore the worsening state 
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of the Qing dynasty after Macartney’s embassy. When Macartney was visiting the Qing court, 
China was at the very end of the so-called ‘Kang-Qian shengshi (prosperous age of the 
Kangxi until the Qianlong reigns, 1662-1795)’. Even though Macartney described China as 
‘an old, crazy, first-rate Man of War’,23 he was in fact comparing the Chinese empire with a 
glorious past that was the product of many westerners’ imagination. When Amherst reached 
China in the later 1810s, however, signs of Qing’s dynastic decline had become increasingly 
evident. Overpopulation, land shortage and unceasing rebellions were major developments 
during this period.24 The imperial government, moreover, was facing serious fiscal problems, 
which obliged the Jiaqing emperor to give up the extravagant tradition of southern tours 
along the Grand Canal to the lower Yangtze delta. Since the numerous lavishly decorated 
buildings on this route, many of which had been built expressly for these imperial tours, 
remained unattended after the Qianglong emperor’s last visit in 1784, their dilapidation, when 
they were seen by members of Amherst’s embassy, became a clear and visible indicator of 
China’s decline under the present emperor. On the basis of this discovery, the widely-
circulated image in Britain of a backward and declining Chinese empire could be supported 
for the first time by an abundance of reliable first-hand evidence. This considerable increase 
in Britain’s knowledge on China not only led to a deterioration in British opinions of China, 
but helped change Sino-British relations in the pre-Opium War era.  
 
II 
In the various accounts of China produced by members of the Amherst embassy, there was a 
general impression that China was in decay during the reign of Jiaqing. Staunton, as the only 
person who had travelled with both embassies, maintained that, ‘there can be little doubt that 
the prosperity of this empire has been on the decline under the government of the present 
emperor, that is, since the period at which it was visited by Lord Macartney’s embassy’.25 
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Staunton wrote that ‘in most points, our present views and estimation of the country and 
inhabitants, seem to differ from those which were formed by the former party, for the 
worse’26 and he believed that it could be attributed to ‘the different state of the imperial 
finances at the two periods’.27 Having read in the Peking Gazette [Jing Bao] that the Jiaqing 
emperor was compelled to abandon even the refurbishment of his own garden for want of 
available funds,28 Staunton became convinced that the Chinese empire was indeed declining 
under its present ruler. To prove this, Staunton recorded every sign of poverty and 
dilapidation that he discovered throughout the long journey from Beijing. As a result, terms 
such as ‘decay’, ‘decline’, and ‘ruinous’ can be frequently found in his journal. Staunton even 
claimed that ‘almost every public building we have seen in our route, has exhibited to us 
more or less evidence of the poverty or negligence of the government’.29 In order to illustrate 
the destitution common in the Chinese countryside, Staunton wrote:  
 
            These hills are perfectly barren, and destitute even of trees – no signs whatever of 
cultivation or inhabitants, except at their feet near the river, or in the lowest parts 
of the intervening vallies. At one, we passed on our left a ruined pagoda of nine 
stories – It seemed wholly abandoned, and had no house or religious 
establishment of any kind in its vicinity. … Some spots had very much the 
appearance of the entrance of mines which, being no longer worked, had been 
neglected, and closed up.30 
 
With regard to an average city in Jiangxi Province, he recorded that:  
 
Within the walls we found no improvement in the style of the houses, or any 
shops that attracted our attention – the walls were low and ruinous … a range of 
buildings … in the style of a large joss-house, but at present in a ruinous state, and 
wholly untenanted … the tribunals of the Nan-gan-foo or governor, … it is 
certainly at present the poorest and most ruinous … The governor’s tribunal and 
residence, was a lofty and extensive, but neglected pile of building. The tribunal 
of the Hien … appeared in so ruinous a state as to be scarcely habitable … several 
stone pailoos … seemed to denote that this city had once existed in a state of 
comparative splendor, from which it had latterly declined.31  
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        Other members of the embassy joined with Staunton in providing their readers with an 
image of a declining China, even though they had not visited China two decades before. 
Henry Ellis, when passing Tsing-heen [Qing xian], noted that ‘the walls and the town itself 
are falling to decay’.32 In viewing a pagoda near the city of Nanchang, Ellis commented that 
it was ‘in exceedingly bad proportions’ and ‘evinced the decay of architecture among the 
Chinese’.33 John Davis, subsequent to his visit to Wu-yuan, an imperial residence of the 
Qianlong emperor, could not conceal his disappointment at what he saw. He entered into his 
Sketches of China that, ‘Like almost everything of the kind that we had seen in the country, 
this once decorated abode was in a sad state of dilapidation and ruin and calculated to 
produce no other emotions than those of melancholy’.34 After Clarke Able paid a visit to the 
celebrated city of Guazhou, similar scenes were recorded in his narrative. He wrote that: 
 
The city of Qua-tchow [Guazhou] did not answer the expectations raised by its 
advantageous situation. Its streets exhibited no characters of opulence, and its 
walls were in ruins. In the days of Kien-Lung [Qianlong], it flourished under 
imperial favour; … Since these golden days in the history of Qua-tchow, as its 
governor informed Mr Morrison, the Fung-shway [Feng-shui], or “fortune of the 
place,” had gradually declined.35 
 
        Based on their conviction that China was in decay, these British travellers became 
increasingly disenchanted with the state of Chinese civilization. Although, at the beginning of 
the Amherst mission, members of the embassy was still divided into ‘those who landed with 
an impression that the Chinese were to be classed with the civilized nations of Europe’ and 
others who ‘ranged them with the other nations of Asia’,36 by the end of the mission, a 
general consensus on the backwardness of China had emerged. This unfavourable perception 
of the Chinese empire was based, first of all, on the perceived image of the Chinese being an 
unrefined people. Upon their arrival on the China coast, members of the Amherst embassy 
were soon ‘astonished to find the fishermen in their boats as naked as savages, without 
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appearing conscious of shame. Sometimes they wore a jacket over their shoulders, but had no 
clothing for the lower part of the body’.37 It was also a commonly-held view that ‘poor boys 
to the age of twelve or thirteen were generally naked, standing, running about in promiscuous 
crowds’.38  In light of these impressions, the Chinese were more and more presented to 
readers of these accounts as a barbaric people, who were frequently compared with animals 
rather than with other human beings. For instance, when Basil Hall gave the local shipmen 
some dollars as presents, he noted that ‘The captain and his crew assembled in a ring, and 
turned over the pieces from hand to hand, just as I have seen a group of monkeys do when 
puzzled with some new object’.39  The residences of ordinary Chinese people, in Abel’s 
opinion, were ‘miserable beyond anything which England can exemplify’ and ‘more like the 
dens of beasts than the habitations of men’.40  
        In light of these discoveries, ‘dirt, squalidness, and extreme poverty’ were identified as 
the ‘leading characteristics’ of ordinary Chinese people.41 Their unhygienic living conditions 
were particularly highlighted by these British observers. Abel found that, in addition to the 
shortage of clean water and the ubiquity of mosquitoes in many parts of China, 42  ‘The 
Chinese are less fastidious than perhaps any other people in the choice of their food’.43 
Whenever dead pigs or rotting vegetables were thrown overboard from the British ships, 
there were always some Chinese people rushing to pick them up and eat them afterwards. The 
Chinese, moreover, were believed to be a people ‘utterly insensible to bad smells’.44 When 
surrounded by curious crowds in Tianjin, Ellis recalled that, ‘there literally prevails a 
compound of villainous stenches, and this constitutes one of the principal inconveniences of 
the crowd that gather round us’.45 On a visit to the famous ‘Bath of Fragrant Water’ near 
Nanjing, the empire’s second city, Ellis claimed that ‘the stench is excessive; altogether I 
thought it the most disgusting cleansing apparatus I had ever seen and worthy of this nasty 
nation’.46 On the same occasion, Abel noted that, ‘There appeared no intention of renewing 
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the water [which] thus become saturated with dirt … The steam arising from it, however 
fragrant to the senses of the Chinese, was to mine really intolerable, and drove me away 
before I could ascertain in what manner the baths were heated’.47 By such multi-sensory 
examinations, the Chinese people’s want of cleanliness, as well as the general image of them 
as an unrefined people, was further confirmed. 
        The British travellers’ disenchantment with Chinese civilization was intensified by the 
poor condition of the public infrastructure in China. According to the accounts provided by 
the members of Amherst’s embassy, the majority of the streets in Chinese cities were 
‘imperfectly paved, narrow, and saturated with bad smells’.48 The roads Amherst took in 
Tongzhou, for example, were so ‘dirty and slippery’ that ‘the poor creatures who carried the 
chairs were up to the knees in water’.49 The express way, which the Chinese promised to be 
of superior construction, turned out to be simply ‘a broad road of hewn granite, which was 
evidently very old, and in so ruined a state that it might have been referred to [in] the days of 
Yaou and Shun’. 50  Even the Grand Canal, which was renowned ‘as an example of the 
immense power of human labour and human art’,51 proved to be much overrated, because 
most of it was ‘only a natural river, modified and regulated by sluices and embankments’.52 In 
a similar way, the vehicles which the Qing government provided for the use of Amherst’s 
embassy were also found to be extremely uncomfortable. The Chinese boats were said to be 
‘ill constructed for comfort in cold weather’53 and the junks for conveying supplies ‘the most 
clumsy looking vessels imaginable’.54 The Chinese carts were also deemed to be ‘the most 
execrable machines imaginable’.55 Riding in these carriages, Morrison noted that, ‘without 
constant effort to hold by the sides of the carriage, a person’s head was thrown first on one 
side and then on the other’.56 During an exhausting overnight journey from Tongzhou to 
Beijing, Davis expressed his regret at having exchanged his horse for one of these ‘wretched 
little Chinese tilted carts’, because ‘the convulsive throes of this primitive machine, without 
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springs, on the ruined granite road, produced an effect little short of lingering death; and the 
only remedy was to get out as often as possible and walk’.57 By contrast, Robert Morrison 
observed that it was probably due to the poor transport available in China that Amherst’s 
British-made carriage attracted so much admiration from the Chinese and was widely 
recognized by them as ‘proper for the Emperor’.58  
        In addition to such observations on the facilities and infrastructure in China, the British 
visitors commented on the state of the Chinese military. Many military posts in China, as 
with other public buildings, were considered to be in urgent need of repair. In particular, the 
British observers found it amusing and absurd that some watch-towers in Shandong province, 
formed entirely of mats, were painted to imitate brick or stone. This was regarded by Davis as 
‘a most unequivocal proof of the unwarlike habits of the nation’.59 Members of Amherst’s 
embassy also concluded that ‘the art of war must be in a very low state’60 in China. Through 
contacts with various Chinese soldiers and mandarins, the British travellers found that bodily 
strength and courage were still seen by the Chinese as the only qualities that were required 
for military advancement. Bows and arrows, indeed, were the most frequently used weapons 
of Chinese military men. Most of the matchlocks that the British saw in China were ‘truly 
wretched and appeared rusted through, so as not to be fired without danger’.61 When Chinese 
soldiers, most of whom were ‘of a very poor and inefficient description’,62 were using these 
weapons, ‘they immediately retreat upon applying the match, squatting down at a short 
distance with their backs turned; the iron tube is always placed upright, so that every 
possibility of danger from the wadding is guarded against’. 63  All these findings, in 
consequence, led the Amherst embassy to believe that the Chinese were indeed a militarily 
weak nation.  
        The British observers’ unfavourable perception of Chinese civilization was reinforced 
by their discoveries about the knowledge and characteristics of the Chinese people. As with 
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the Macartney mission, members of Amherst’s embassy were convinced by their experiences 
that the Chinese were indeed so ignorant that the Europeans ‘can learn nothing from China’.64 
Shortly after the embassy landed in China, Morrison realised that, although he had marked all 
the baggage in Chinese characters, the boatmen and porters were unable to read.65 Davis also 
noticed that the military mandarin attached to his boat could not even write in Chinese as well 
as he could and that this man’s ‘general ignorance on every subject … made it vain to hope 
for any information from him’. 66  When Abel, the naturalist, was collecting plants or 
examining stones during the journey, he was often laughed at by the natives and the escorting 
soldiers, as if he did so only to satisfy his peculiar curiosity. When Abel spoke to some of 
these people, he found the British to them were like ‘inhabitants of another world’, because 
‘our features, dress, and habits, were so opposed to theirs, as to induce them to infer that our 
country, in all its natural characters, must equally differ from their own. “Have you a moon, 
and rain, and rivers in your country?” were their occasional questions’.67  
        Despite their profound ignorance, the British observers discovered that the Chinese still 
had a deep conviction of China’s superiority over all other nations. In the vicinity of 
Shandong’s northern frontier, the British envoys met the judge of Beizhili, a loquacious man 
who had a certain amount of knowledge about the world beyond China. Although he was 
‘better informed respecting the geography and history of European states, than any other 
Chinese with whom the Embassy became acquainted’,68 this gentleman spoke of Britain as a 
country ‘depending altogether on commerce … great by sea, but weak by land’.69 He also 
asserted that, in contrast to the inferior position and status of Britain, ‘the Chinese empire was 
in the center of the universe, and the supreme head of all nations’.70 For this reason, due 
homage should by all means be paid by the British ambassador to the emperor of China in 
order to win concessions for British merchants who traded at Canton. Otherwise, the judge 
was afraid that ‘it might prove the absolute ruin’ 71 of the British nation. To the British 
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observers, this understanding of Britain as well as of Sino-British trade was so poor that 
‘ignorance and conceit were perhaps never more strongly combined’. 72  Because of their 
unique sense of self-importance, the Chinese were found to be very reluctant to recognize 
anything foreign that appeared to be superior to their own designs. In terms of the different 
attitudes that the Chinese and the British adopted towards modern science and technology, 
Davis maintained that: 
 
they are too proud to learn anything about us, while we foreigners of course never 
lose an opportunity of studying them in every relation of life, and have availed 
ourselves to some purpose of the opportunities, (scanty as these may have 
comparatively been,) which years of intercourse afforded us. That “power” which 
consists in “knowledge”, therefore, preponderates on our side.73 
 
        Apart from their investigations into the Chinese people’s knowledge, members of the 
Amherst embassy also attempted to examine the spiritual state and general character of the 
Chinese people. To begin with, it was discovered that, compared to the serious and exalted 
religious beliefs in Europe, religion in China ‘has all the looseness and vanity with less of the 
solemnity and decency of ancient Polytheism’. 74  According to the observations of these 
British travellers, there were no particular dates set aside for public worship, and nor did the 
Chinese attend temples congregationally. The majority of the Chinese population were utterly 
unselective in the deities to which they paid respect, so long as they believed that the practice 
would help avert mischief befalling them. Most of the priests in China were found to be 
uninstructed themselves, as well as largely illiterate. As mere performers of ceremonies, they 
neither preached like their counterparts did in Europe, nor were they treated by their 
followers with the reverence that was ‘justly and reasonably due to the respectable ministers 
of religion in all countries’.75 In view of these facts, Morrison claimed that:  
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The general principles of our religion give a tone of elevation and dignity to the 
human mind which is not felt here. … They do not associate under something 
approaching equality for the worship of their gods. … The multitudes of people in 
this country are truly, in a moral and religious view, as ‘sheep without a 
shepherd’.76 
 
        On the basis of such images, the main characteristics of the Chinese people were 
described as being ‘selfish, cold-blooded and inhumane’. 77  Morrison maintained that the 
professed moral maxims of the Chinese were actually ‘ineffectual in regulating their minds 
and conduct’.78 Since the Chinese were never ‘nice about a strict adherence to the truth’,79 
they could, in fact, be ‘complaisant and servile, or insolent and domineering, according to 
circumstances’.80 For instance, ‘When interest or fear do not dictate a different course, they 
are to the strangers, haughty, insolent, fraudulent and inhospitable’. Moreover, ‘A merchant 
will flatter a foreign devil (as they express it), when he has something to gain from him; then 
he can be servile enough; particularly if he is not seen by his own countrymen’.81 Abel, in this 
regard, pointed out that, particularly in the trading part of the Chinese community, ‘the 
principle of cheating is so legitimated amongst them by the general practice and toleration of 
their countrymen, as to be considered rather as a necessary qualification to the successful 
practice of their calling, as an immoral quality’.82 Because of what constantly occurred to the 
Amherst embassy, Abel added that, ‘If giving false weight, charging centuple prices, and 
substituting bad articles for good, form a species of theft, it is not confined to the sea-coast, 
but is practised all over the empire of China, and is not only tolerated but applauded, 
especially when foreigners are its victims’.83 Based on all these findings and experiences, 
when it came to the general character of the Chinese, Ellis contended that they were, ‘half 
civilized, prejudiced’84 and ‘without exaggeration’, a ‘nefarious’ people.85 As for China’s 
ranking in comparison to other civilizations in the world, Ellis concluded that, although it was 
‘superior to the other countries of Asia in the arts of government and the general aspects of 
society’, China was undoubtedly ‘inferior by many degrees to civilized Europe in all that 
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constitutes the real greatness of a nation’.86 On the question of whether the Chinese could 
justifiably be described as barbarians, Morrison produced the following statement:  
 
If “barbarity” or being “barbarous” expresses something savage, rude and cruel, 
the present inhabitants of China do not deserve the epithet; if it expresses a 
cunning selfish policy, endeavouring to deceive, to intimidate, or to brow beat, as 
occasion may require, connected with an arrogant assumption of superiority on all 
occasions, instead of cultivating a liberal, candid, friendly intercourse with men of 
other nations, they are barbarians.87 
 
These arguments put forward by Ellis and Morrison fairly represent the common opinions of 
the members of Amherst’s embassy by the end of their visit to China. It can be clearly seen 
that the disagreements previously expressed on this subject had changed significantly. A 
consensus on the half-civilized image of China was reached by all the British observers who 
participated in the Amherst embassy and subsequently recorded their opinions on China and 
its people. 
 
III 
In seeking an explanation for the backwardness of Chinese civilization, members of the 
Amherst embassy concluded that the Qing government was the primary cause. Since, during 
the return journey, they were given many opportunities to visit Chinese cities and villages as 
well as to communicate with various different Chinese people, these British travellers were 
able to gather much more first-hand evidence than their predecessors on the real conditions in 
China. In particular, these observers were convinced that the suspicious government of China 
had deliberately designed its policies in order to suppress the natural sentiments and pursuits 
of its subjects. First of all, although the leading characteristics of the Chinese appeared to be 
prejudiced and inhuman, it was agreed that these qualities were more the consequence of the 
government’s narrow policies than the natural disposition of the people. These observers 
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maintained that the Qing government attached a great deal of importance to restricting 
contacts between foreigners and the Chinese people, and hence the country’s foreign trade 
was restricted only to the port of Canton. Although the Macartney embassy had been 
permitted to pass through the interior of China, its members had not been allowed to make 
extensive contact with the local inhabitants. Because of such restrictions, the previous 
western impressions of the Chinese people and of the state of Chinese society were drawn 
mainly from evidence gained at Canton. This allowed Hall to admit that ‘it is obviously as 
unfair to judge of the Chinese by such data, as it would be to estimate the character of the 
English from such materials as Rotherhithe and Wapping might afford’.88  
        Over recent centuries, in those regions, such as Canton, where frequent engagements 
with foreign people had taken place,89 or amongst those social classes whose professions and 
activities involved contact with foreigners, a belief in the inferiority of all foreign nations and 
a distrust of their good intentions had been promoted by the Qing authorities. In consequence, 
a deep prejudice against as well as a serious contempt for all foreigners had been inculcated 
in the minds of the Chinese people. Despite this, members of the Amherst embassy found that, 
‘in places remote from Canton, and where it is not the policy of the local authorities to 
discourage all inquiry, there is no jealousy or apprehension of strangers’. 90  When they 
travelled to some places which had ‘probably never before been visited by any Europeans’,91 
these British visitors often discerned and benefited from the cheerful disposition and 
hospitality of the local inhabitants. This claim can be supported by many examples found in 
the accounts produced by members of the Amherst mission. For example, Clarke Able noted 
that: 
 
I was often enabled to get amongst them apart from my friends and usual 
attendant soldiers, and always found them mild, forbearing, and humane. 92 … 
especially when they were peasants, [they] afforded a pleasing contrast in their 
simple manners and civil treatment of strangers, to the cunning designs of the 
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salesmen of Tung-Chow, and the brutal importunity of the courtiers of Yuen-
Ming-Yuen.93 
 
Ellis added that, when he entered the dwellings of some local residents, ‘No dislike is shewn 
by the people in general to natural inquisitiveness; on the contrary, our momentary intrusions 
have been met by invitations to sit down’.94 In contrast with the prevailing impression that the 
Chinese were guarded in their relations with foreigners, these friendly natives either pressed 
them to partake of their meals or supplied them with tea, or even invited these visiting 
strangers to examine the yards and outer apartments of their houses.95 As a result of these 
experiences, members of the Amherst mission were further persuaded that it was the 
deliberate policies of the Qing government that considerably altered the genuine disposition 
of the Chinese people. 
        In addition to its efforts to restrict the nation’s contact with foreign peoples, the Chinese 
government was also found to be promoting tensions and difficulties within the country’s 
hierarchical society. On the one hand, the Chinese people was placed in awe of the 
government, because, under the powerful hand of that authority, government officials ‘have 
the knack of rendering life very miserable, and assume the power of bambooing, torturing, 
fining (or squeezing), and every species of oppression short of death’.96 Throughout their 
journey, the British travellers witnessed a number of cases where Chinese men and women 
were bambooed or face-slapped after making trifling mistakes. Some poor people were also 
seen to be forced by the embassy’s attendant officials to work without charge for the fleet.97 
As a result of these facts, it was believed that, ‘China does not enjoy liberty. Her government 
is a military despotism. … The strong arm of power intimidates them’.98 In consequence, the 
Chinese people were seriously discouraged from discussing affairs of state or forming any 
societies which might seek to influence or oppose the government. Moreover, since according 
to the criminal code of China, ‘an ineffectual attempt to save the life of another, under the 
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slightest shade of suspicion, is followed by the punishment of death’,99 the Chinese were 
found unwilling to give assistance even if they saw someone’s life was in danger. Instead of 
taking this as an example of the Chinese people’s inhumane character, however, the British 
observers attributed it to the ‘absurd and unjust principles upon which the Chinese laws are 
administered by the mandarins’. 100  John Macleod, for example, clearly stated that, ‘It is 
lamentable to observe that the institutions of any nation should have the effect of deadening 
every feeling of sympathy, and of exciting, instead of discouraging, “man’s inhumanity to 
man;” but such is the case in this country’.101  
        On the other hand, it was agreed by these British observers that the mandarins 
themselves were also not free from concerns about their own self-preservation. Their offices 
and lives were totally subject to the will of the Chinese emperor, insomuch that ‘not only the 
more important measures of government, but the most trifling details of office, depend for 
their execution upon the supposed irresistibility of the imperial power’.102 In particular, these 
British visitors were informed that ‘in the event of any suspicion of a collusion with 
foreigners’, the emperor’s ‘single word was sufficient to consign them [the mandarins] to 
death’.103 For the members of the Amherst embassy this explained the sharp contrast between 
the attendant officers’ extremely reserved manner in the vicinity of Beijing and the good 
temper they manifested during the rest of their time with the embassy. In the early stages of 
the return journey, Amherst believed that, ‘Being now at so short a distance from the Capital, 
it appeared probable that most questions would be decided by an immediate appeal to the 
Emperor himself’.104 Probably for this reason, the mandarins appeared quite cautious about 
entering into any formal conversation with the British envoys and nothing could induce them 
to accept any presents. Nevertheless, it was observed that ‘as we receded from the 
neighbourhood of Peking, the mandarins had become more frequent and less reserved in their 
visits, very readily accepting any presents that were made them’. 105  In light of these 
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discoveries, the British observers were led to believe that, just as with the Chinese populace, 
the government officials in China were entirely at the mercy of their sovereign. Their liberty 
and natural sentiments were therefore greatly restricted and constrained by the power and 
caution of the Chinese emperor.  
        Last, but not least, the government of China was viewed by the Amherst embassy as the 
chief obstacle to the Chinese people’s pursuit of knowledge and wellbeing, as well as to the 
progress of Chinese civilization. To justify this conclusion, Macleod maintained that, the 
Chinese government not only made its people believe ‘themselves at the summit of 
perfection’, but established ‘the absurd tyranny of fettering the human understanding, by 
forbidding all innovation and improvement’.106 For instance, although some Chinese people 
did indeed have an interest in astronomy, the study of the human frame, western medical 
practices, and so on,107 the Chinese government prohibited the masses from undertaking such 
studies. Instead, it narrowed their ideas ‘by compelling their attention, and attaching 
importance, entirely to the observance of useless forms and ceremonies’,108 and ‘by admitting 
of no deviation from one contracted path, even in the simplest transactions of life’.109 In 
particular, Davis maintained that the Chinese government ‘habitually inculcate[d] a 
respectful demeanour on the part of young people towards their elders’.110 The benefits of 
such institutions were considered to be so apparent in their effects, because ‘in no country of 
the world does a quiet, easy subordination so extensively prevail as in China’, where the 
‘inexperience and headstrong passion of youth’ were repressed without inspiring 
resistance. 111  Furthermore, these British commentators contended that many measures 
adopted by the Chinese government were inimical to the welfare of the people and also 
restricted the development of China’s civilization. For example, during their travel through 
the Chinese interior, members of the Amherst embassy discovered that, although China’s 
foreign trade was restricted to Canton, there was actually much interest and eagerness on the 
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part of the Chinese people to trade with the British.112 Moreover, in those places where 
greater engagement with westerners took place, particularly in Canton, the British travellers 
claimed that they were able to discern a distinct air of opulence that was hard to see in the 
rest of China. Ellis noted in this regard that:  
 
Canton, from the number and size of the vessels, the variety and decorations of 
the boats, the superior architecture of the European factories, and the general buzz 
and diffusion of a busy population, had, on approaching, a more imposing 
appearance than any Chinese city visited by the present embassy; nor do I believe, 
that in the wealth of the inhabitants at large, the skill of the artificers, and the 
variety of the manufactures, it yields, with the exception of the capital, to any city 
in the empire. … The whole effect of foreign commerce is here concentrated and 
displayed, and the employment which the European trade affords to all classes of 
the inhabitants diffuses an air of general prosperity, not to be expected where this 
powerful stimulus does not operate.113 
 
        With regard to this phenomenon, these British travellers were convinced that it was 
‘owing greatly to hints furnished by our examples’114 rather than being due to any positive 
influence exerted by the local government. To prove this, evidence was provided to 
demonstrate that the communities around Canton had benefited remarkably from modern 
technology introduced by the British. Abel noted in his narrative that:  
 
The small pox, which for centuries has at different periods made dreadful havock 
all over the empire, is likely soon to be extirpated by the benign influence of 
vaccination establishing under the auspices of Mr Pierson the principal surgeon of 
the British factory. … Native vaccinators have been appointed and educated under 
the eye of Mr Pierson, and are taking from him the labour of inoculating the 
lowest class of Chinese. I witnessed their operations in a temple near the British 
factory, on some of the children of the hundreds of anxious parents who flocked 
to procure the preservation of their offspring from the small pox, at that time 
prevalent at Canton. If the paternal government of China can free itself from 
national prejudices, it will erect a monument of gratitude to the discovery of 
Jenner, and the services of Pierson.115  
 
In contrast to such positive benefits arising from contact with a more advanced civilization, 
the British observers lamented that similar changes had been rendered impossible in the rest 
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of the Chinese empire because of the policies deliberately adopted by the Qing government. 
For this reason, the common belief within the embassy was further strengthened that the 
Chinese ‘have had for some thousand years a dawn of civilization’, but, ‘from the operation 
of the most narrow-minded principles’, it ‘has never brightened into day’.116 Accordingly, the 
suspicious Qing government, as the designer of such restrictive policies, was seen to be the 
primary cause of China’s backwardness and the country’s stagnant civilization. 
        The unprecedented freedom of movement afforded the members of the Amherst 
embassy during their return journey through China allowed these British observers to explore 
the interior of China and to communicate more fully with the Chinese government and people 
than ever before. As a result of the considerable first-hand evidence gathered and 
subsequently published by these men, a consensus was reached about the backward image of 
China and some unfavourable perceptions of Chinese civilization, which had already been 
circulating in Britain, were rendered more credible than ever before. To explain China’s 
backwardness, the Qing government was blamed by these British visitors as being chiefly 
responsible for placing obstacles in the way of the progress of Chinese civilization as well as 
damaging the general welfare of the Chinese people. This view of the Qing government, to a 
great extent, laid the foundations for the mounting hostile attitude in Britain towards the 
government of China in the following decades. By 1840, many in Britain had come to the 
conclusion that the unreliable government of China not only constrained the Chinese people’s 
pursuit of personal and commercial freedom, but was beginning to endanger Britain’s 
commercial interests and national honour in Asia. This made it easier to justify a policy of 
open hostility towards China that came to be accepted by a majority in the British parliament. 
Although it cannot be maintained that the unfavourable impressions of China and the Qing 
government conveyed to the public by the published accounts of members of the Amherst 
embassy had determined the outbreak of the Opium War, open conflict with China would 
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probably not have been as imaginable or as acceptable without the evidence provided by 
these members of the Amherst mission. The British, moreover, probably would not have been 
confident enough to attack such a large and populous country as China had they not become 
convinced of China’s serious decay and growing weakness. For these reasons, the Amherst 
embassy should not be regarded simply as a diplomatic failure. Its significance in the history 
of British-Chinese relations is much more profound than it appears to be if we look closely 
only at Amherst’s failure to meet the Chinese emperor because of his refusal to kowtow to his 
imperial majesty.   
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